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THE POWER OF THE PRESIDENT TO GRANT A GENERAL PARDON OR AMNESTY FOR OFFENCES AGAINST THE UNITED
STATES.
THE proclamation of President Johnson of 25th December
1868, purports to grant full pardon and amnesty to all persons
engaged in the late rebellion, for the offence of treason against the
United States, or of, adhering to their enemies during the late
civil war. This proclamation, practically, could only benefit those
offenders described in it who, at the time it was issued, were underindictment in the courts of the United States, and these were veryfew in number. In respect to all others (except those "fl eeing
from justice"), the Statute of Limitations, which limits the period-,,
for the finding of an indictment for treason to three years next
after the act of treason (Act of 30th April 1790, § 32; U. S,
Stats. at Large, vol. 1, p. 119), has long since served as an act
of amnesty, full, complete, and without condition or exception.
But the authority of the President to issue this proclamation has
been called in question and denied in a report of the Judiciary
Committee of the Senate of the United States, made by Senator
Edmunds on the 17th February last; and, as every question
involving the nature and limits of a grant of power conferred by
the Constitution on any branch or department of the government
is always entitled to a careful and candid examination, the reasons
assigned for the conclusion of the committee that the President
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cannot, by proclamation, without the authority or assent of Congress, grant general pardon or amnesty, and that, consequently,
this proclamation was not authorized by the Constitution or laws,
challenge a respectful consideration. The question is, whether
the granting of general pardon or amnesty was within the power
vested in the President by the Constitution; and not whether,
allowing this power to be thus vested in the President, its exercise
in the particular case was judicious or expedient. It will be conceded by all that the power which the Constitution grants to the
President is an inseparable incident to the presidential office, and
that it is the same in measure and degree at all times, by whomever that office may be held.
The Constitution of the United States (Art. 2, § 2) provides that the President "shall have power to grant reprieves and
pardons for offences against the United States except in cascs of
impeachment." By § 13 of chap. 195 of the Public Acts of the
Second Session of the 37th Congress, :entitled "An Act to sup.
press insurrection, to punish treason and rebellion, to seize and
confiscate the property of rebels, and for other purposes,".approved
July 17th 1862, it was provided as follows, viz.:"See. 13. And be it further enacted, That the President is hereby authorilzed, at any time hereafter, by proclamation, to extend tc persons who may
have participated in the existing rebellion in any state or part thereof, pardon and amnesty, with such .exceptions and at such time and on such conditions as he may deem expedient for the public welfhre :" U. S. Stats. at
Large, vol. 12, p. 592.

This 13th section of the Act of 17th July 1862 was repealed
by chap. 8 of the Public Acts of the Second Session of the 39th
Congress, which took effect on the 19th January 18G7, by not
having been returned by President Johnson to the House of Congress in which it originated, within the ten days prescribed by the
Constitution, whereby it became a law without his approval. But
if the President, indepe.ndently of the section thus repealed, was
invested with the power to grant pardon and amnesty for offences
against the United States, his power would remain the same after
this section was repealed as it existed before the repeal. If the
power was conferred on him by the Constitution, that section,
when it became a law, did not add anything to his constitutional
power; and, when it was repealed, the repeal could not diminish
or lessen that power. No statute law can take away from the
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President a power conferred upon him by the Constitution. If,
on the other hand, the power of the President to grant pardon and
amnesty for offences against the United States in the recent
rebellion is not vested in the President by the Constitution, and
cannot be exercised without the authority or assent of Congress,
then, by reason of the repeal of this section2 the three proclamations of pardon and amnesty issued by the President on 7th September 1867, 4th July 1868, and 25th becember 1868, were
severally issued without authority from the Constitution or the
laws, and can have no legal efficacy or effect whatever. The
question is therefore presented, whether the constitutional power
of the President "to grant pardon for offences against the United
States," includes the power to grant an amnesty or general pardon for the same offences? And here the definition of the terms
pardon and amnesty becomes necessary.
" A pardon," says Chief Justice MARSHALL, in the case of
United States v. Wilson, 7 Peters 150, " is an act of grace proceeding from the power intrusted with the execution of the laws
which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed from the
punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed." Worcester defines pardon as being "the remission of a fault or crime,
or of a penalty; forgiveness; absolution; acquittal." Webster
defines it as being, (1.) "Forgiveness; the release of an offence,
or of the obligation of an offender to suffer a penalty, or to bear
the displeasure of the offended party. We seek the pardon of
sins, transgressions, and offences. (2.) Remission of a penalty.
An amnesty is a genieral pardon. (3.) Forgiveness received."
Amnesty is defined by Worcester as "an act of oblivion or indemnity; a general pardon or freedom from penalty granted to those
guilty of some crime or offence ;" and Webster defines the same
word as being "an act of oblivion; a general pardon of the
offences of subjects against the government, or the proclamation
of such pardon." In Lieber's Encyclopodia Americana, amnesty
is defined as " an act of oblivion; the entire freedom from penalty
granted to those who have been guilty of any neglect or crime,
usually on condition that they return to their duty within a certain
period." Bouvier, in his Law Dictionary, in defining amnesty,
makes a distinction or difference between amnesty and pardon,
both in their nature, application, and effect; and yet, in defining
pardon, he says that general pardons are express, when an act
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of the legislature is passed expressly directing that offences of a
certain class shall be pardoned, as in th e case of an act of amnesty,
and that special pardons are those which are granted by the pardoning power for particular cases. It is very properly said in the
report of the Senate Judiciary Committee that "the objects of a
general pardon or amnesty are whole classes of the community
whose united or concurrent misdeeds in promoting a common
design have brought them under the law, and whose treatment is
necessarily a question of government and security to society, depending upon political considerations which belong alone to the
sovereign power."
Amnesty is a word of Greek derivation, and
is an exact synonym or equivalent of the word oblivion, which is
of Latin derivation. From these definitions it will be seen that
those who claim that the President, though having power to grant
.ardons, has no power to grant amnesty, for offences against the
United States, are compelled to interpret the words of the Constitution which invest him with "power to grant pardons," as
giving him only a power to grant special pardons, but no power to
grant general pardons.
The power bf pardon conferred by the Constitution on the
President is plenary and unlimited, except in bases of impeachment. It is coextensive with the power to punish, and extends
to every offence known to the law; and it may be exercised at
any time after the commission of the offence, either-before legal
proceedings are taken, or during their pendency, or after conviction and judgment. Its exercise, and the mode of its exercise,
are placed, without condition or limitation, wholly in the discretion of the President, and it is not subject to legislative control.
It includes the power to grant conditional as well as absolute pardons, and of commuting to a milder punishment that which has
been'adjudged against the offender. These propositions are fully
supported by decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States
in the cases of United States v. Wilson, 7 Peters 150; -E yarte
Wells, 18 How. 307; and Ex yarte Garland, 4 Wall. 333. The
power of pardon may be exercised even after the full punishment
awarded for the offence has been suffered, if any of the legal consequences of the conviction remain. In United States v. Jones,
2 Wheeler's Crim. Cas. 451-in the United States Circuit Court in
New York city, per THOmPSON, J.-it was held that'a person convicted of a felony, and pardoned after he had suffered the entire

THE PRESIDENT'S POWER OF GENERAL AMNESTY.

517

punishment awarded against him, was restored by the pardon to
competency as a witness; and KANE, J., in United States v.
Stetler, in the United States Circuit Court in Philadelphia, February 1862, expressed the same opinion, and added that "in very
many cases, the consequential disability is the most painful incident of the conviction :" Wharton's Amer. Criminal Law, 4th
ed., § 766, note.
It was formerly doubted whether a pardon could do more than
take away the punishment, leaving the crime and its disabling
consequences unremoved. But it has long been settled that a
ppardon, whether by the king or by an Act of Parliament, removes
not only the punishment but all the legal disabilities consequent
on the crime. "The king's pardon doth not only clear the offence
itself, but all the dependencies, penalties, and disabilities incident
unto it :" Cuddington v. Wilkins, Hobart's Rep. 81, 82. "The
king's pardon takes away ponam et eulpam in foro humano," so
as to render an infamous man a competent witness, and, "though
it restores not the blood, yet, as to issues born after, it hath the
effect of a restitution:" Hale's Pleas of the Crown, vol. 2, p.
278; vol. 1, p. 358; 2 Russell on Crimes 975. "A pardon
reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offence and the
guilt, of the offender, and when the pardon is full, it releases the
punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye
of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed
the offence. * * There is only this limitation to its operation:
it does not restore offices forfeited, or property or interests vested
in others in consequeice of a conviction and judgment:" Ex parle
Garland, 4 Wall. 338. In Baum v. Clause, 5 Hill 196, BRoNswN,
J., disapproves of the case above cited from Hobart, so far as it
affirms that a pardon takes away the guilt as well as the punishment of the offence; but in this he is clearly in opposition to the
whole current of English authority for the last two hundred and
fifty years.
The language used in the Constitution in conferring on the
President the power "to grant pardons," must be construed by
the exercise of that power in England prior to the Revolution, and
in the states prior to the adoption of the Constitution: .Ex parte
Wells, 18 How. 307. In United States v. Wilson, 7 Peters 150,
MARSHALL, C. J., says: "As this power had been exercised from
time immemorial by the executive of that nation whose language
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is our language, and to whose judicial institutions ours bear a close
resemblance, we adopt their principles respecting.the operation
and effect of a pardon, and look into their books for the rules
prescribing the manner in which it is to be used by the person who
would avail himself of it"
The report of the Senate Judiciary Committee presents two
propositions or statements'of historical fact as the basis or foundation of its entire argument-in support of the conclusion that the
President has no power to grant general pardon or amnesty for
offences Against the United States, by proclamation, without the
-authority or, assent of Congress, viz. :-(1.) That the power of
general pardon by proclamation did not exist, and was not claimed
by any Englsh sovereign, after Great Britain had a constitution
and a settled jurisprudence,: "although it was frequently exercised under and by Acts of Parliamentfrom the earliest years of
the reign of Elizabeth (1535), until after the American Revolution," from which "the clear conclusion is, that under the English
system of government, no power, either of amnesty or general
pardon" [sic] "existed in the king;" and, (2.) That the knowledge of these legal terms, amnesty and pardon, and of their settled meaning and effect, must have existed in the Constitutional
Convention of 1787, and that the convention, by not using the
word amnesty in the article conferring power on the President
"to grant pardons," must be understood as intending not to
invest him with any power to grant amnesty for offences against
the United, States. These statements are vital to the argument,
and deserve examination.
In England, one of the inseparable incidents of a conviction
and judgment for treason or other capital crime was attainder,
the consequences of which were forfeiture of real and personal
estates ajnd corruption of the blood; whereby the attainted person could neither inherit lands from his ancestors, nor retain those
he was already in possession of, nor transmit them by descent to
any heir, and he also obstructed all descents to his posterity
wherever they were obliged to derive a title through him to a remoter ancestor. He could not be heir to any ancestor, nor his
children heirs to him, nor to any of his ancestors, from whom
they could not claim but through him. In this way, the sins of
1 15637
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the fathers were visited upon the children, not merely to the third
and fourth generation, but to the end of time. The king's pardon was always held sufficient to acquit the offender of all corporal penalties and forfeitures annexed to the offence for which it
was granted, and could restore to him his forfeited goods and
chattels, but not his lands. Even if granted after conviction, but
before judgment, it was sufficient to prevent attainder, which
attached to the judgment and not to the conviction. But by the
corruption of the blood the rights of private subjects jecame
affected; and the blood, when once corrupted, could not be purified or restored except by the authority of Parliament. Hence
arose the necessity for a resort to the power of Parliament to
effect a restoration of the blood after attainder. In this country,
attainder, with all its incidents and consequences, is practically
unknown. In England, corruption of the blood was abolished in
all cases except the crimes of high treason and murder by statute
of 54 Geo. 3, c. 145; and by statute of 3 & 4 Will. 4, c.106,
§ 10, it was enacted that corruption of blood on attainder shall
not obstruct descents to the posterity of the offender where they
are obliged to derive a title through him or her to a remoter
ancestor*,-thus in effect almost realizing the hope expressed by
Blackstone (4 Comm. 888, 440), "that corruption of the blood
may one day be abolished and forgotten."
The report of the Senate Judiciary Committee says that pardon and amnesty "are words which have been known and used in
the law for hundreds of years, and that their scope and meaning
has never been the subject of dispute ;" and, while contending
that these words "import widely different things," concedes that
an act of amnesty is an act of general pardon. But it may be
doubted whether the word amnesty should be considered as a term
of the law in the same sense that the wordpardon is. It is not to
be found in any statute, and is not often used by the text writers of
the English law; and whenever it is used, it is as a term of English
lexicography, and not as a technical term of the English law.
The king's power of pardoning was said by our Saxon ancestors
to be derived from the law of his own dignity (a lege suc dignitatis); and it was declared in Parliament by statute of 27 Hen. 8,
c. 24, that no other person hath power to pardon or remit any treason or felonies whatsoever, but that the king hath the whole and
sole power thereof united anal knit to the imperial crown of the
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realm: 4 Black. Comm. 397. In The King v. Parsons, Holt's
Rep. 519, HOLT, C. J., says :-" The power of pardoning all
offences is an inseparable incident to the crown; and it is equally
for the good of the people that the king should pardon as that he
should punish.
*
*
The king, by his coronation oath, is to
show mercy as well as to do justice." By the English constitutution, the sovereign power of the realm is considered as existing in
Parliament, of which the king, as well as the lords and commons,
is a *onstituent part,-he having a negative upon the acts'of
the lords and commons as absolute as that which each house of
our Congress has over the acts of the other,-and no act can become a law without the consent of the king, as well as of the
lords and commons. Whatever can be done in this country by
the people in convention may be done in England by an Act of
Parliament. An Act of Parliament may be unprecedented, but it
can never be unconstitutiomzl. It may .alter the succession to the
crown, and even change the whole structure of government.
Blackstone speaks of the power of Parliament as being "1high and
transcendent:" 4 Comm. 402, 1 Id. 189; and De Lolme, in his
work on the Constitution of England (p. 134, note), facetiously
says that "it is a fundamental principle with English lawyers that
Parliament can do everything except making a woman a man, or
a man a woman." No more significant illustration of the sovereign power of Parliament can be given than is furnished by those
acts which are called bills of attainder. These parliamentary
judgments of doom, though a disgrace to a country having a settled jurisprudence and the regular administration of the law, are
to be found in nearly every period of English history.
It cannot be questioned that a general pardon by Act of Parliament, applicable to whole classes of the community, is more
beneficial than a special pardon by the king's charter to a particular person of one of those classes, or that it has always been
so regarded. The courts must take judicial- notice of such a
general pardon, when it is full and unqualified, as of any other
public Act of Parliament; and a man is not bound to plead it,
neither can he lose the benefit of it by his own laches or negligence, as he may of the king's charter of pardon. A pardon by
Act of Parliament usually, though not necessarily or invariably,
contains clauses restoring the blood, when corrupted, and taking
away all the other consequences of attainder, if applicable to any
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persons attainted, which the king's charter of pardon could not
do; and where it is full and absolute, or without qualification or
exception, the courts are obliged to take notice of it, even though
the party waives it or does not plead it. The king's charter of
pardon, on the contrary, must be specially pleaded, and that at a
proper time; and, if not so pleaded, the benefit of it is thereby
waived and lost. So if a pardon by Act of Parliament contains
exceptions of offences or persons, the court cannot take notice 'of
it, neither can the party have the benefit of it, unless by pleading
he shows that he is not one of the persons excepted, though comm.only advantage is given to the offender by the act itself without
pleading: Wood's Institute of the Laws of England (9th ed.,
folio, London, 1763), p. 660. For these reasons, a pardon by
Act of Parliament is more beneficial and desirable than a pardon
by the king's charter; and hence the occasion of pardons by Act
of -Parliament.
The occasions for the exercise of the power to grant pardon or
amnesty in favor of whole classes of community, whether by the
king's charter or by Act of Parliament, arose nearly always from
political offences in insurrections or rebellions against the existing
government; and these have not been of frequent occurrence in
English history. A general pardon by Act of Parliament is
called by writers on English law an act of grace-the same name
or term applied by Chief Justice MARSHALL in United States v.
Wilson, 7 Peters 150, to a pardon granted by the executive authority to a particular person by name. Sometimes, though improperly, it has been called an act of indemnity.' Acts of indemnity
are passed, as much of course as the supply bills, at every session
of Parliament, for the relief of those who have neglected to take
the necessary oaths, &a., required to qualify them for their
respective offices, and may be initiated in the Lords or Commons ;
but an act of grace always originates with and proceeds from the
king. Thus, the Act of 1 Will. & Mary, sess. 2, c. 8 (1689),
entitled "An act for preventing vexatious suits against such as
acted in order to the bringing in their majesties, or for their service," was an act of indemnity. Macaulay, in his History of
England, vol. 3,p. 442 (Butler's Philadelphia ed., 8vo.), says:"Between an act of grace originating with the sovereign and an
act of indemnity originating with the estates of the realm there
are some remarkable distinctions. An act of indemnity passes
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through all the stages through which other" laws pass, and may,
during its progress, be amended by either House. An act of
grace is received with peculiar marks of respect, is read only once
by the Lords and once by the Commons, and must be either
rejected altogether or accepted as it stands." One of the " peculiar marks -of respect" with which an act of grace is received by
the Houses of Parliament, as stated by Macaulay (same vol., p.
443), is, that each House stands up uncovered while the act of
grace is read. Blackstone (Comm., vol. 1, p. 187) says that
" when an act of grace or pardon is passed, it is first signed by
his majesty, and then read once only in each of tbt Houses, without any new engrossing or amendment;" and that when it has
received the sanction of the two Houses of Parliament, as it
" originally proceeds from the crown and has the royal assent in
the first stage of it," the clerk of the Parliament pronounces to
the king "the gratitude of the subject in Norman-French words,
translated as follows: '-The prelates, lords, and commons in this
present Parliament assembled, in the name of all your other
subjects, most humbly thank your majesty, and pray to God to
grant you in health and wealth long to live :'" Id., p. 188.
It is stated in the report of the Senate Judiciary Committee
that the power of general pardon " was frequently exercised under
and by Acts of -Parliamentfrom the earliest years of the reign
of Elizabeth until after the American Revolution./' As has been
already remarked, the occasions for the exercise of this power,
whether by the king's charter or by Act of Parliament, have not
been frequent in Eglish history.; but this statement need not be
questioned in any other respect. This power was exercised under
and by Acts of Parliament eleven times during the reign of
Elizabeth, and only nine times from the close of her reign in 1603
to the period of the American Revolution. The exercise of this
power under and by Acts of Parliament can be traced to a period
nearly two hundred years earlier than the reign of Elizabeth;
and the power was probably exercised under and by Act of Parliament from the very earliest period of parliamentary history,
and certainly at a period as far remote as that in which attainder
with its consequences became a part of the English law. Previous
to the first year of the reign of Henry VIII., Acts of Parliament
had no distinct titles, there being only a general title for all the
acts passed in the session ; but in that year, distinct titles were
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introduced for each act or chapter: 1 Black. Comm. 187. In
ancient editions of the Statutes at Large, the substance only of such
acts or chapters as were of a temporary character, or had become
obsolete, is published; and, consequently, none of these acts of
grace or pardon are now to be found published at length, even in
editions of the Statutes at Large which must now be regarded as
ancient, -prior to the act passed on the restoration of Charles II.,
in 1660 (12 Car. 2, c. 11); and the practice of stating the substance of the several chapters or acts when they were not published at length was continued in ancient editions of the Statutes
at Large long after distinct titles were introduced for each
chapter.
The earliest Act of Parliament of this character of which any
trace is now to be found in the Statutes at Large was passed in
1376, in the fiftieth year of the reign of Edward III., the father
of Edward the Black Prince. The substance of this act (50
Edw. 3, c. 3) is stated in ancient editions of the Statutes at Large
as follows :-" This being the year of the King's Jubilee, he doth
grant pardon to his people of alienations without license, intrusions, fines, amerciaments, issues, forfeitures, reliefs, escuages,
debts, accounts, the suit of his peace, except, &c." This act was
confirmed by Act of 1 Rich. 2, c. 10, passed in the next year
(1377). The Act of 6 Rich. 2, c. 13 (1382), is stated to be:
"The King's Pardon to his subjects after the late Insurrection ;"
and this was followed in the next year (1383), by the Act of 6
Rich. 2, st. 2, c. 1, which is stated to be: "A more large Pardon
granted by the King to the offenders in the late Insurrection, with
few exceptions." These acts reach back to a period nearly one
hundred years before the invention of printing, and earlier than
that from which the statutes of the realm are now extant in an
unbroken series. Five acts of the same character appear from
the Statutes at Large to have been passed in the reign of Richard
II. (1377 to 1399); three in the reign of Henry IV. (1399 to
1413); one in the reign of Henry VIII. (1509 to 1547); three
in the reign of Edward VI. (1547 to 1553); eleven in the fortyfive years of the reign of Elizabeth (1558 to 1603), the first of
which is the Act of 5 Eliz., c. 31, in 1563; and three in the
reign of James I. (1603 to 1625).
The substance of the Act of 3 & 4 Edw. 6, c. 24, is stated to be
"A confirmation by Parliament of the King's Pardon of all Here-
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ses, Treasons, Rebellions, Murders, Felonies, Offences, Trespasses,
&c., saving such which in the said Pardon be excepted."
The
restoration of Charles I L in 1660 was followed by an act of grace
passed in the same year (12 Car. 2, c. 11), entitled "An Act of
Free and General Pardon, Indemnity, and Oblivion," and another
act of the -same character was passed in 1673, in the same reign,
(25 Car. 2, c. 5), entitled "An Act for the King's Majesties most
Gracious, General, and Free Pardon."
After the revolution in
1688, two such acts were passed in the reign of William and
Mary, and of William III., viz.: one in 1690 (2 W. & M. sess. 1,
c. 10), and one in 1694 (6 & 7 W. 8, c. 20). A similar act was
passed in 1717 (3 Geo. 1, c. 19), on the occasion of the insurrection or rebellion in Scotland, in favor of the Pretender in 1715;
and a like act was passed in 1747 (20 Geo. 2, c. 52), on the occasion of the second and last insurrection or rebellion in Scotland,
under the lead of the son of the Pretender in 1745,-these being
the only occasions of insurrection or rebellion against the existing
government in Great Britain, involving large masses and whole
classes of the community, which have occurred since the revolution of 1688. Every one of these acts contains exceptions and
conditions, sometimes affecting individuals by name, and sometimes. affecting whole classes of the community,-as, from the
benefit of each of the last two of these acts the entire clan of
Macgregor in Scotland was excepted. The titld of each of the
last five of these acts is "An Act for the King's" (or "the King
and Queen's") "most Gracious, General, and Free Pardon." The
word amnesty does not appear in the operative words of any of
them, and the nearest approach to the use of a word of equivalent meaning which is to be found in any of them is in the use
of the word oblivion, a word which is used both in the title and
operative words of the Act of 12 Car. 2, c. 11, but in no other
act. The operative words of this act are, "that all and all manner of treasons, murthers, felonies, offences, orimes," &c., * *
counselled, commanded, acted, or done since," &c.,
*
*
"by any person or persons before," &c.,
*
*
"other than
the persons hereafter by name excepted, in such manner as they
are hereafter excepted,"
* * *
"be pardoned,released, indemnified, discharged,and put in utter oblivion." The operative
words of each of the other acts are precisely the same as those
usually employed in the king's charter of pardon, viz. :-
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"be acquitted, pardoned,released, and dischargedagainst"

the king's majesty, his heirs and successors, and every of them,
of and from all and all manner of treasons, misprisions of treason, felonies, treasonable and seditious words or libels," &c., &c.
The object of each of these acts is "a general and free pardon," and in every one of them this pardon is recognised as proceeding from the king in the exercise of his royal prerogative.
The participation of Parliament in the act is merely in confirmation of the royal grace and favor, so as to make it more effectual
and beneficial in the particulars which have already been mentioned than the king's charter of pardon (the benefits of which
might be waived or lost through ignorance or negligence) could
be; and it is in no sense in derogation or denial of the king's
prerogative to grant a general pardon. The purification of blood
corrupted by attainder could only be effected by an Act of Parliament, but not even an Act of Parliament could, without extpress
words, effect this; and Acts of-Parliament to reverse attainders
cannot be considered as being in derogation of the king's prerogative of pardon, or even as being a necessary part of an act of
general pardon. They may precede the pardon, or accompany
it, or follow it, as was illustrated in the case of Lord Bolingbroke,
who was attainted of treason in 1715 by Act of Parliament.
Having fled from the realm, he was, in 1723, pardoned by the
king, but the effect of this pardon was only to save his life, and
did not enable him to resume and enjoy the family inheritance
which was settled upon him without an Act of Parliament. In
1725, on his petition to the Parliament with the consent of the
king, an act was passed relieving him from the execution of the
act of attainder with respect to his forfeitures, so that he was enabled to resume and enjoy his family estates: Smollett's History
of England, vol. i., pp. 520, 589, 594, Albany edit. of 1816.
Acts reversing attainders have been frequently passed, and they
may originate in either House of Parliament; and they are treated
as ordinary bills, and not as an act of grace or general pardon
proceeding from the king. In respect to the claim that "amnesty is a larger power than pardon," it is difficult to conceive
how amnesty, which by any recognised definition is no more
than a grant of entire freedom from a penalty or the consequences of a crime, can be of any higher significance or effect
than a full and complete pardon for the same crime, or how it can
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differ from such a pardon in its nature, extent, effect, or application. The following extract from the observations of Lord Chief
Justice HoLT, on the trial of Andrew Bookwood for high treason,

in 1696 (13 State Trials, Howell's ed., p. 186), will show that
the judgment of that great lawyer was in direct conflict with the
argument and conclusions of the report of the Senate Judiciary
Committee in relation to the extent and limits of the king's prerogative to grant pardons, viz:Phipps,for prisoner, "claimed that an Act of Parliament pardon removes
those disabilities which the king's pardon does not; for every one is in law
a party to an Act of Parliament, and therefore no person shall be permitted to allege in disability of another any crime which he himself hath pardoned, for that is to aver against his own act; but it is otherwise in the case
of the king's pardon."
L. C. J. (HoLT).-" Why, the very parliamentary pardon comes from the
king; the king has a full power of pardoning, and where he does pardon
under the Great Seal, it has thefdl effect of the Parliament'pardon. A pardon before attainder prevents all corruption of blood, so that though a man
forfeits his goods by conviction, yet, after a pardon, he is capable of having
new goods, and shall hold them without any forfeiture whatsoever 5 for the
pardon restores him to his fobmer capacity, and prevents any further forfeiture. Indeed, if he had been attainted, whereby his blood was corrupted,
no pardon, whether it were by the king or by the Parliament, could purge
his blood without reversal of the attainder, by writ of error, or Act of
Parliament, or express words in the act to restore blood; but either pardon
makes him a new creature, gives him new capacity, and -makes him, to all
intents and purposes, from the time of the pardon, to be probus et lZegalis
homo, and a good witness."

It never was doubted that the exercise of the king's prerogative
of pardon might be restrain d or controlled by Act of Parliament,
and several acts have been passed for this purpose. Thus the
transporting and committing any man to prison without the realm
is made 'bythe Habeas Corpus Act, 31 Car. 2, c..2, a crime unpardonable by the king; and by 12 & 13 W. 3,c. 2, it is declared
that no pardon under the Great Seal shall be pleadable to an
impeachment by the Commons in Parliament.

By statute of 2

Edw. 3,c. 2, and 14 Edw. 3,c. 15, it is provided that no pardon
of homicide shall be granted, but only where the king may do it
by the oath of his crown; that is, where a man slayeth another in
his own defence, or by misfortune; but the royal power in this
respect is enlarged by the later statute of 13 Rich. 2, st. 2, c. 1,

which provides that no pardon for treason, murder, or rape shall
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be allowed unless the offence be particularly specified; and particularly in murder it shall be expressed whether it was committed
by lying in wait, assault, or malice prepense. But no Act of
Parliament was ever passed to restrain or limit the king's prerogative to grant a general pardon. Apart from the provisions
of the statute last mentioned, requiring that in a pardon for treason, murder, or rape, the offence shall be particularly specified,
the use of general words in the king's charter of pardon (such as
0 felonies," &c., without a particular specification
a pardon of al
or description of the felony intended to be pdrdoned) was always
allowed by the courts only a very imperfect effect,-it being held
that a pardon of "1all felonies" would not pardon a conviction or
attainder of felony (because it was to be presumed that the king
knew not of those" proceedings), but that the conviction or attainder must be particularly mentioned: 4 Bl. Com. 400. Hawkins (P. C., B. 2, c. 87, § 9) suggests this as one of the reasons
why " general pardons are commonly made by Act of Parliament ;"
and he adds that such pardons "have been of late years very
rarely granted by the Crown, without a particular description of
the offence intended to be pardoned." This eminent writer on
Crown law expresses no doubt of the existence of the power of
the king to grant a general pardon, even while thus stating the
reasons why such pardons are commonly made under and by Act
of Parliament. The imperfect effect which general words in the
king's charter of pardon may have, is an objection which is applicable merely to the manner in which the power of pardoning should
be exercised; and it does not in anywise touch or draw in question
the existence of the royal prerogative to grant a general pardon.
It is said in the report of the Senate Judiciary Committee that
"the power of general pardon by proclamation did not exist, and
was not claimed by any English sovereign, as the committee believe, after Great Britain had a constitution and a settled jurisprudence." The time when Great Britain first had a constitution
and a settled jurisprudence may be regarded as not entirely
definite. A reference to the English constitution would suggest
Magna Carta; and England may be considered as having a
constitution from the time when the great charter was granted
by King John in 1215, or certainly from the time of the solemn
confirmation of that charter by his son and successor Henry IH.
in 1253. Edward I., the son of Henry L., succeeded to the
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crown on the death of his father in 1272. Sir MATTHEW HALE
justly styles him the English Justinian, and says that more was
done in the first thirteen years of his reign to settle and establish
the distributive justice of the kingdom than in all the ages since
that time put together: Hale's Hist. C. L. 158; 4 B1. Com. 425.
The result of the battle of Bosworth Field in 1485,-two hundred
and seventy years after the grant of the great charter by King
John, and more than two hundred years after the commencement
of the reign of Edward I.,-terminated the usurpation of Richard
II., and brought the Earl of Richmond to the throne, and he
became king under the title of Henry VII. Among the published
works of Lord BACON is a History of the Reign of King Henry
VII., of which Lord BACON made a Latin translation for circulation on the continent. The works of Lord BACON have recently
been edited in England with great care, learning, and ability by
Messrs. Spedding, Ellis, and Heath, and this history is to be
found in the 11th volume of the American republication of their
edition of Lord BACON'S Works (Boston, 1860-61).
In this
history, after describing the situation of public affairs at the time
of the accession of Henry VII. to the Crown, Lord BACON says,
vol. 11, p. 57: "The 7th of November" (1485) "the king held
his Parliament at Westminster, which he had summoned immediately after his coming to London. His ends in calling a Parliament (and that so speedily) were three. * * The third to calm
and quiet the fears of the rest of that party by a generalpardon;
not being ignorant in how great danger a king stands from his
subjects, when most of his subjects are conscious in themselves
that they stand in his danger." Upon these words,-" a general
pardon,"-Mr. Spedding subjoins to the text the following note:
. "9This is explained in the (Latin) translation to mean such a pardon as
was usual after a Parliament. Ut inferiors conditionis liomines qui Ri.
chardo adhaserent (ne forte novis motibus materiamprceberet), remissionem
generalem, qualis in fine comitiorum a rege emanare.solt, consequerentur.
The nature of this general pardon is further explained in the Index Tocabulorum appended to the translation. It is defined indulgentia Regis qua
et crimina omnia (exceptit que in instrumento -emissioni speciatim recensentur), et mulcto, alicegue oolutiones Regi debito abolentur. And it is
added that it may proceed either from the king alone or from the king and
Parliament. 11a quandogue a Rege solo emanat, quandoque a Rege addita
auctoritateParliamenti. It seems that Henry's first intention was to take
the latter method, but that he changed his mind. See p. 62.'
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An act of attainder was passed at this Parliament against
Richard I., and some of his leading adherents; and Lord Bacon,
after stating this, proceeds (vol. 11, p. 62) as follows:"And for the pardon of the rest that had stood against the king (i. e.,
those against whom no bill of attainder had been passed), the king upon a
second advice thought it not fit it should pass by Parliament, the better
(being matter of grace) to impropriate the thanks to himself: using only
the opportunity of a Parliament time, the better to disperse it into the veins
of the kingdom. Therefore during the Parliament he published his royal
proclamation, offering pardon and grace of restitution to all such as had
taken arms or been participant of any attempts against him, so as they
submitted themselves to his mercy by a day, and took the oath of allegigiance and fidelity to him, whereupon many came out of sanctuary, and
many more came out of fear, no less guilty than those who had taken sanc(See also Hume's History of England, vol. ii., p. 202, Albany
tuary."
edit., 1816.)

Lord BAcoN, in describing the close of the reign of Henry
VII., says (vol. 11, p. 854):"To crown also the last year of his reign (1508-9), as well as the first,
he" (the king) " did an act of piety, rare and worthy to be taken in imitation. For he granted forth a general pardon, as expecting a second coronation in a better kingdom."
It will be noticed from the instances already mentioned, that
the power of general pardon under and by Act of Parliament was
certainly exercised more than one hundred years before the commencement of the reign of Henry VII. ; and so far was the exercise of the same power by the king's proclamation from being
questioned as being in excess of his royal prerogative, or an
infringement on the prerogative of Parliament, that in the reign
of Henry VIt., the son and successor of Henry VII., it was
enacted by Parliament (" to its eternal disgrace," as Blackstonejustly says,-Comm., vol. 4, p. 431), that the king's proclamations
should have the force of Acts of Parliament-thus investing the
king to the fullest extent with " the high and transcendent
power" of Parliament, and making him, in fact, a constitutional
*autocrat and despot.
But English history furnishes other examples of the exercise
of the power of general pardon by the king's proclamation, occurring more than two hundred years after Henry VII. succeeded to.
the crown, and at a time when it cannot be questioned that EngVOL. XVII.-34

530

THE PRESIDENT'S POWER OF GENERAL AMNESTY.

land "had a constitution and a settled jurisprudence." Blackstone (4 Comm. 438), says that "the constitution of England had
arrived to its full vigor, and the true balance between liberty and
prerogative was happily established by law, in the reign of King
Charles H." James IL succeeded Charles II. in February 1685.
In the following summer the Duke of Monmouth, the eldest of
the many illegitimate sons of Charles II., and a leader who was
almost idolized by the populace, laid claim to the crown, alleging
the legitimacy of his birth and that he was by right of blood
King of England. He organized an extensive insurrection in
the west of England, and was proclaimed king at Taunton, where,
on his arrival, he was presented, by a train of twenty-six young
girls, with an embroidered banner and a Bible. A bill of attainder
for treason was passed against him by Parliament; and at Sedgmoor, on the 6th July, in "the last fight deserving the name of
battle that has been fought on English ground," he was defeated,
and his army was entirely routed. On the second day after, he
was captured; and, seven days afterwards, he was executed on
the scaffold at the Tower Hill, under the act of attainder. Then
ensued the punishment of those who had been involved with him
in the insurrection, and that series of military and legal atrocities
by which Kirke and Jeffries literally made the west of England
an Aceldama-the one being the incarnation of the most intense
military, as the other was of the most intense judicial, brutality.
It was the boast of Jeffries, after his return from the Western
Assizes, in the autumn of that year, that he had hanged more
traitors than all his predecessors together since the Conquest.
An atonement having been made with blood to the satisfaction
of the royal vengeance, the king, in the following spring (March
15th 1686), granted, by proclamation, a general pardon, with a
few exceptions, to all those who had been implicated or engaged
in the insurrection; but among the exceptions were the young
girls of Taunton who presented the banner and the Bible to Mon.mouth: 1 Macaulay's History of England 442, note; Mackintosh's History of the Revolution in England in 1688, p. 82;
Rapin's History of England, vol. 15 (8vo. ed.), p. 47. Well does
Macaulay say (p. 441), that "the cruelty of James II. was
not more odious than his mercy, or, rather, his mercy and his
cruelty were such that each reflects infamy on the other."
The insurrection of Monmouth was followed, in a little more
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than three years, by the events of the Revolution of 1688, which
brought William and Mary to the throne. After the Prince of
Orange landed in England, King James commenced a retraction
of the worst of those fatal measures by which he had disaffected
the whole kingdom, and he made various concessions for the
ostensible purpose of regaining the affections of his people.
Among these concessions were the calling of a Parliament, and
the grant, by proclamation, of a free pardon to all who were in
rebellion against him: Macaulay's History of England, vol. 2,
pp. 854-356; but, whatever effect these concessions might otherwise have had, the folly and misconduct of the king was such that
nothing which he yielded or promised could sensibly arrest or stay
the progress of the Revolution. In the fourth year of his exile
(1692), King James published a declaration to all his "loving
subjects," renewing his claim to the crown, and announcing his
intentions in respect to those who had assisted in overthrowing
his authority and were instrumental in effecting the other results
of the Revolution. In the following year (1693), he published
another declaration, in which he promised, inter alia,that he would
grant a free pardon to all his subjects who should not oppose him
after he should land in England.
It was the object of the Declaration of Rights (1 W. & I., sess.
2, c. 2), one of the earliest Acts of Parliament in the Revolution,
and the instrument by which William and Mary were called to the
vacant throne, and which settled the order of succession to the
crown, to set forth in the most distinct and solemn manner the
fundamental principles of the English 6onstitution. It was prepared by a committee of which Somers was chairman. As a
constitutional lawyer, he was honored with the highest rank in
his own age, and it may safely be said that no other age of English history has produced his superior.
In this Declaration of Rights is contained a recapitulation of
the errors and crimes of King James which had made the Revolution necessary, and an assertion of the rights which had been
by those errors and crimes violated. It complained of the assumption and exercise by the king of an illegal dispensing power, or
the power of dispensing with or suspending the execution of penal
laws, and especially of those laws which prevented Papists from
filling offices in the state and the church,-of his levying taxes
without grant of Parliament,-of his maintaining a standing
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army in time of peace without consent of Parliament,-and of
many other breaches of the royal prerogatives; but it contains
no word of censure, nor even an allusion in respect to his exercise of the power to grant a general pardon by proclamation.
No intimation is made by any lawyer, statesman, or historian of
the time, or by any writer on English constitutional history, "as it
is believed," that in exercising this power King James exceeded
the limits of the royal prerogative. On the contrary, Macaulay
(vol. iv., p. 170, vol. ii., p. 386), in referring to the declaration
of King James in 1692, censures it in that while it denounced
vengeance against large classes of people, it did not offer a general amnesty to the rest. Why should King James offer a general
amnesty if he had no lawful power to grant it, or if, without the
consent of Parliament, he could not make it effectual ?
There is no instance in which the exercise by the king of the
power to grant a general pardon by proclamation was ever made
the subject of complaint, censure, or question by Parliament; and
it is very clear from the cases which have been referred to that
the power to grant a general pardon or amnesty has uniformly
been treated in England as being included within the royal prerogative of pardon, even when exercised under and by Acts of
Parliament. In other words, the power to grant pardon in England has uniformly been treated as being a generic power, while
an act of amnesty is merely one of the forms in which that power
is exercised; and, so far is an act of amnesty from being "a
widely different thing" from a pardon, that the essential and distinguishing feature of every act of amnesty is the fact of pardon.
The whole matter may be summed up in the declaration of Lord
BACON, before referred to, that "a general pardon may proceed
either from the king alone, or from the king with the authority
of Parliament in addition," with the declaration of Lord HOLT in
.ookwood's Case, ubi tupra, that when the king grants a pardon
under the great seal, "it has the full effect of the Parliament
pardon."
L. 0. K.
(To be continued.)

